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The dyadic assessment framework –
studying the strategies animals use to
gather information during one-on-one
contests, andhow this assessmentdrives
contest behaviors and outcomes –
can be fruitfully adapted to intergroup
contests: those between stable social-
living groups.
Heterogeneity among group members
and how groups cohere to make effec-
tive decisions are unique features ofResearch on how competitors assess (i.e., gather information on) fighting ability
and contested resources, as well as how assessment impacts on contest pro-
cesses and outcomes, has been fundamental to the field of dyadic (one-on-one)
contests. Despite recent growth in studies of contests between social-living
groups, there is limited understanding of assessment during these intergroup
contests. We adapt current knowledge of dyadic contest assessment to the
intergroup case, describing what traits of groups, group members, and resources
are assessed, and how assessment is manifested in contest processes
(e.g., behaviors) and outcomes. This synthesis helps to explain the role of
individual heterogeneity in assessment and how groups are shaped by the selec-
tive pressure of contests.social living that add complexity to inter-
group contest assessment.
Understanding intergroup contest as-
sessment can inform research in social
evolution and ecology, for example, by
revealing selective pressures on group
size evolution and drivers of population
dynamics.
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Animal contests determine access to crucial resources such as territory, food, and mates.
Because contest outcomes result in the unequal distribution of resources (e.g., mating opportu-
nities [1]), contests influence resource ecology. In addition, traits such as dynamic displays [2] and
exaggerated weapons [3] are thought to evolve, in part, under the selective pressure of contests.
Much of our knowledge of contests has come from studies of assessment (see Glossary), or
information-gathering, during dyadic contests between individuals. Models of dyadic contests,
which have usually been validated using evolutionary game theory [4], and experimental tests of
these models (reviewed in [5]), show how individuals assess intrinsic traits (behavioral, morpho-
logical, physiological) of themselves and/or their competitors, as well as extrinsic factors
(e.g., resources). In turn, this assessment influences strategic decision-making such as the deci-
sion to give up a contest (Box 1). We term this suite of models and corresponding approaches for
experimental tests the dyadic contest assessment framework.
More recently, there has been rapid growth in the field of intergroup contests – contests be-
tween groups of social-living organisms. This work has been driven, in part, by attempts to under-
stand human conflict [6,7]. Intergroup contests are also widespread in non-human organisms,
including bacteria (multiple species) [8], ants (e.g., harvester ants Messor barbarus) [9], eusocial
shrimps (Synalpheus spp.) [10], birds (e.g., acorn woodpeckers Melanerpes formicivorus) [11],
and non-human primates (multiple species) [12]. Research into intergroup contests has generally
focused on group member participation in conflict, and some work has also studied variation in
conflict intensity [13–16]. Our understanding of assessment during intergroup contests – how
groups gather information on themselves, each other, and/or contested resources, and how
that information is used to make group-level decisions – is still underdeveloped [17].
Adapting the Dyadic Contest Framework to Intergroup Contests
The power of a rich history of dyadic contest research is the availability of a well-established
framework that can be readily adapted to intergroup contests. The dyadic contest assessment
framework can be studied through theoretical and empirical exploration of its individual compo-
nents (Figure 1, Key Figure). These components include how competitors assess fighting ability
and the ownership and value of contested resources, and how assessment is modified by priorTrends in Ecology & Evolution, February 2021, Vol. 36, No. 2 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2020.09.007 139
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Glossary
Assessment: information-gathering
and processing. In the context of
contests, assessment usually regards
ability or resources and can be
influenced by experience.
Attrition rate: rate of death of
individuals in a group. This is used to
differentiate among Lanchester’s law
models of intergroup conflict (Box 1).
Collective action problem: an
occurrence wherein not all group
members may participate in a collective
effort, but success depends on
collective behavior. For example, not all
members of a larger group will join in an
intergroup conflict, thereby reducing the
group size advantage.
Dyadic contest: a direct interaction
between a pair of individuals where each
attempts to exclude the other from
access to an indivisible resource unit.
Dyadic contest assessment
framework: a set of theoretical models,
with corresponding experimental
approaches for testing model
predictions and assumptions, that
describe how competitors assess ability
and resources to resolve dyadic
contests.
Heterogeneity: variation among group
members, for example, in sex, resource
holding potential, resource ownership,
resource value, or experience.
Intergroup contest: a direct
interaction between two groups of
social-living animals, each composed of
two or more individuals, where each
group attempts to exclude the other
from access to an indivisible resource
unit. An intergroup contest can consist
of multiple dyadic contests between
individuals of opposing groups.
Lanchester’s laws: theoretical models
of intergroup conflict defined by attrition
rates.
Resource holding potential (RHP):
the absolute fighting ability of an
individual or group.
Resource ownership:which individual
or group owns a contested resource or
resources (e.g., a territory, a mate, food
resources) at the beginning of a contest.
Also termed 'prior residency'.
Resource value: the value of the
resource to each opposing individual or
group. Ideally measured in fitness units,
for example, the increase in reproductive
success that an individual or group
would achieve from gaining or defending
a contested resource.
Box 1. Dyadic and Intergroup Contest Assessment Theory
Both dyadic and intergroup contests are associated with specific theories that make predictions regarding how contests
should proceed. However, the focus of those predictions differs between the two types of contest. Dyadic contest theory
usually generates predictions about within-contest changes in the intensity of fighting, based on assumptions regarding
the adaptive value (that is in some but not all cases verified as an evolutionarily stable solution) of various assessment
strategies. By contrast, intergroup theory makes predictions about attrition rates experienced by the weaker side, based
on assumptions about the effect of using a numerical advantage in two distinct ways (see below).
Dyadic contest theory has a long history at the core of behavioral ecology [38]. Empirical work has focused on directly test-
ing the assumptions, and sometimes the predictions, of three models: the sequential assessment model (SAM) [66], the
energetic war of attrition (EWOA) model [50], and the cumulative assessment model (CAM) [82]. The SAM assumes that
each rival compares its own resource holding potential (RHP) with that of the opponent, and losers give up when they
know they are weaker ('mutual assessment'). The EWOA and CAM assume that losers give up when the accumulated
costs cross a threshold ('self-assessment'). A correlational approach described by Taylor and Elwood [78], as well as anal-
yses of contest behavioral progressions [83], are often used to distinguish between these two assessment rules (Figure I),
although many contests may fall outside this dichotomy [72,77].
Intergroup contests are considered by a body of theory spanning third-party interventions up to conflicts between larger
groups (reviewed in [13,17]). In the latter case, key ideas come from Lanchester’s attrition laws developed during World
War I. Thesemodels consider how superior numbers could be best utilized when armies have access to ranged weapons.
If extra numbers on the more numerous side are held in reserve until needed (i.e., the more numerous side matches the
number of combatants and/or materiel allocated by the less numerous side), then Lanchester’s linear law should be
followed (Figure I). Lanchester’s square law would be followed if the more numerous side commit their extra numbers
to the fray, such that members of that side can concentrate their attacks on the outnumberedmembers of the weaker side
(Figure I).
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Figure I. Analyses to Differentiate between (A,B) Dyadic Contest Models and (C) Lanchester Models of
Intergroup Contests. (A) The assumptions of all dyadic models predict a positive correlation between costs and the
resource holding potential (RHP) of the loser (solid line). For correlations between costs and winner RHP (broken line),
sequential assessment model (SAM) and cumulative assessment model (CAM) predict a negative correlation, whereas
the energetic war of attrition (EWOA) indicates a weak, positive correlation. (B) EWOA and CAM (solid lines) predict that
competitors can use any behavior at any point during the contest, whereas SAM (broken lines) predicts that behaviors
progress in escalating phases without de-escalation. Circles represent behaviors, arrows indicate transitions between
behaviors. (C) Lanchester’s linear law (solid line) predicts that the attrition rate of the weaker group increases linearly
with an increase in the stronger group’s numerical advantage, whereas the square law (broken line) predicts that
attrition rates increase with the square of stronger group numerical advantage.
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behaviors, and outcomes, with impacts on ecology and trait evolution (Figure 1).
What Is Assessed?
Resource Holding Potential
Before a boxing match, commentators describe the 'tale of the tape' for both competitors,
outlining size-based metrics such as weight, height, and reach that are thought to be associated
with fighting success. In dyadic contest research, similar metrics describe what Parker [18]140 Trends in Ecology & Evolution, February 2021, Vol. 36, No. 2
Social cohesion: how much or well a
group acts as a unified force. Can be
measured by temporal and/or spatial
coordination of group member
behaviors (e.g., via social networks) or
other metrics.
Key Figure
A Framework for Assessment during Intergroup Contests
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OPEN ACCESStermed resource holding potential (RHP), defined as 'absolute fighting ability'. RHP is a
theoretical concept that is often measured by proxy as the single variable that best predicts
contest success [19] (Table 1). Most commonly this is body mass [19]; other proxies include
weapon size [20] and physiological capacity [21]. The behaviors important to a given contest
system have been thought to drive RHP proxies; for example, systems where contests involve
frequent physical contact might find force output the best RHP proxy, whereas systems where
competitors avoid contact might find endurance-based RHP proxies, such as fat or glycogen
reserves, more important [22]. A recent meta-analysis, however, found no support for this
functional approach in arthropods [23]. Though often measured as a single trait, RHP may
instead be a composite of many morphological, physiological, and/or behavioral traits. For
example, boxing success is not determined by reach alone, but likely by a combination of weight,
height, reach, skill in delivering punches, and other factors.
The best-supported single RHP proxy in intergroup contests is group size: the number of
members in each group. A recent meta-analysis affirmed this in primates [12], and group size
is relevant in other taxa from ants (e.g., wood ants Formica rufa) [24], to lions (Panthera leo)
[25], to birds (green woodhoopoes Phoeniculus purpureus) ([26]; cf [27] where group size does
not predict outcomes in greater anis Crotophaga major). However, proxies other than absolute
numbers might be important. A functional approach might predict that total group mass is a
better RHP proxy than group size in contests that involve high levels of physical contact. Other
metrics of intergroup contest RHP reveal the importance of within-group heterogeneity (Box 2).
For example, although group size was an RHP proxy in grey wolf (Canis lupus) intergroup contests,
groups with more males could overcome a group size disadvantage [28]. Males are larger andmore
aggressive than females, suggesting a functional reason for the impact of group heterogeneity on
RHP. Finally, group social cohesion could also be a proxy of intergroup contest RHP – groups
that execute contest behaviors in a more coordinated fashion may be more likely to win. Exactly
as for dyadic contests, RHP for intergroup contests is likely a suite of traits comprising – within
and among group members – morphology, physiology, and behavior.
Previous fighting experience can impact on how animals assess their own RHP and/or that of their
opponent (Table 1). One well-known example in dyadic contests, with building evidence in inter-
group contests, is winner and loser effects (Figure 1), in which winners of contests are more likely
to win future contests, and losers to lose (reviewed for dyadic contests in [29]). Winner and loser ef-
fects are often observed in the behaviors used in subsequent contests. For example, male red-
bellied woodpeckers (Melanerpes carolinus) that won simulated (via playback experiments) con-
tests gave more territorial displays to future simulated intruders [30]. In intergroup contests, winnerFigure 1. For a Figure360 author presentation of Figure 1, see the figure legend at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2020.09.007
Competing groups may assess (A1) resource holding potential (RHP), (A2) resource ownership (RO), and resource value (RV)
(A3) Experiencemodifies the assessment of RHP, RO, and RV. In (A1–A3), filled circles represent groupmembers; the left-hand
group in each scenario is predicted to win (indicated by >). In (A1), RHP proxies include group size (number of circles), individua
size (size of circles), and group social cohesion (number of lines connecting circles, as in a social network). In (A2), resource
ownership (territory) or resource value (mates, young) can determine group success. (A3) A winner and/or loser effect; the
winner of contest 1 wins contest 2, and the loser of contest 1 loses contest 2. (B) Assessment is manifested in (B1) the
costs (e.g., energy, damage, death) paid by groups and group members (the plot shows the prediction that costs increase
with contest duration differently for individuals of high and low quality); (B2) behaviors, including patterns of contest behaviors
(open circles represent behaviors, arrows indicate transitions between behaviors) or individual recruitment (filled circles
represent individuals, arrows indicate recruitment of individuals to smaller group); and (B3) contest outcomes (the plot indicates
that relative RHP predicts the probability of contest success, e.g., of group A over group B, in a manner that is modified by RO)
(C) Assessment impacts on (C1) ecology and (C2) evolution. (C1) Prediction that resources become more heavily monopolized
by high-RHP groups as variance in between-group RHP increases. (C2) Prediction that, across taxa, group size evolution may
correlate with the strength of the effect of group size on contest success.




Table 1. The Definition and Importance of Key Concepts in Animal Contests, Examples from Dyadic Contests, and Equivalent Examples and Peculiar
Features of Intergroup Contests




gathering about ability and/or
resources; influences
decision-making





Lanchester’s linear and square
models (Box 1); dynamic contest
models (Box 3)
May occur at the level of individual or
at the level of the group (e.g., dyadic







variation with costs is used to
differentiate between
assessment strategies (Box 1)
Body mass; weapon
size; physiological
capacity; skill or vigor
Group size (number of members);
cohesion; traits of individuals
(as in dyadic)









Territory; shelter; mates; food Motivation may vary among group
members according to sharing rules
and time spent owning the resource
Resource
value (RV)




(size, quality); mates (size,
fecundity); food (amount,
quality); hosts (size, for
parasitic spp.)
Territory and/or shelter (size, quality);
mates (size, fecundity); food (amount,
quality)
Motivation may vary among group
members according to sharing rules
Contest
experience
Prior experience in a contest
(e.g., winner and loser effects)
may influence the assessment of





Future fighting success; contest
behaviors; physiology (e.g., hormone
secretion); movement post-contest
(e.g., toward territory center); within-
group behaviors (e.g., grooming)
More study is needed of effects on
future fighting success; experience
and effects may differ among
members; both intra- and intergroup
conflict may affect experience
Costs Variation with RHP is used to
differentiate between
assessment strategies (Box 1);





death (owing to contest
or predation)
Energy; damage (physical or
physiological); risk of death (owing to
contest or predation)
May accrue differently for different
group members (e.g., dominants vs
subordinates); death is more
common in intergroup contests
Behaviors Execution incurs costs;
patterns of behaviors are used
to differentiate between





Signaling; exerting force (e.g., biting,
pushing) with body and/or weaponry;
recruitment of group members;
cohesive behaviors (e.g., grooming)
Individual behaviors may impact on
group-level behaviors (e.g., signals
inducing recruitment)
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the area in which the contest occurred less frequently [31], moved faster and further than winning
groups [32], or slept closer to their territory center ([33]; cf [34] where losers slept closer to the ter-
ritory boundary). Although these behavioral changes imply a loser effect, none of these studies
tested whether losing groups actually lost, or winning groups won, future contests – a key compo-
nent of establishing winner or loser effects.
In the same way as understanding dyadic RHP helps to develop hypotheses for how contests
influence trait evolution (e.g., animal weapons [35]), studies of intergroup contest RHP and its
assessment can reveal selective forces that act on group living. For example, a competitive
advantage of increased group size may lead to the evolution of larger groups (Figure 1).
Resource Ownership and Value
Which competitor owns a contested resource [36] and the value of the resource to each
competitor [37] is a central feature of dyadic conflict that also plays an important role in
intergroup contests (Figure 1). These resource ownership (also termed 'prior residency')
and resource value effects essentially modify fighting ability by affecting motivation
(Table 1). Competitors that begin the contest as resource owners may have more information
about the resource than non-owners, and therefore be more motivated to keep it [38]. Similarly,
competitors that value a resource more may be more motivated to keep or win it. For example,Trends in Ecology & Evolution, February 2021, Vol. 36, No. 2 143
Box 2. Unique Problems of Intergroup Contests
Intergroup contests are characterized by two features, heterogeneity and social cohesion, that play no role in dyadic
contests. Unlike individuals, groups are inherently heterogeneous, being composed of individuals that vary in size,
strength, genetic relatedness, and the value they place on contested resources. Group resource holding potential
(RHP) is thus determined by both individual attributes and social cohesion – that is, the degree to which group members
act together. Heterogeneity is the source of the collective action problem (CAP), where group success depends on
collective effort, but the costs of effort are borne by the individual [84]. Individuals that are weaker or place lower value
on a contested resource are predicted to free-ride on the effort of their stronger or more incentivized group mates [85].
The CAP hinders the evolution of collective aggression, particularly in large groups that are not bound tightly by kinship
or ecological constraints [57,86,87].
The CAP, like other social dilemmas [85], can be overcome by coercion or inducements to cooperate. Among Turkana
warriors, for example, desertion or cowardice during intergroup raids is later punished by severe beatings and the extrac-
tion of fines [88,89]. In some non-human animal societies, participation in collective conflict is encouraged through affiliative
behavior during or after an intergroup encounter [90–92]. Punishment is particularly effective in asymmetric relationships
where the benefits of collective action flow back to the punisher [93–95]. In general, hierarchical societies are less
vulnerable to the CAP because high-ranked individuals, who gain the largest share of the fitness benefits of contests,
are predicted to overcompensate for free-riding by low-ranked individuals [16].
Strong social cohesion may leave heterogeneous groups vulnerable to the emergence of 'exploitative' leaders, who may
initiate conflicts that benefit themselves but not the rest of the group [96]. Exploitative leadership is predicted when leaders
gain greater benefits or suffer lower costs from conflict than other group members, but where there are strong constraints
against desertion. In such circumstances, selection acting on leaders can lead to damaging levels of intergroup conflict,
with negative consequences for population fitness. This model can explain violent intergroup conflict in banded
mongooses, a species in which females lead groups into contact with rival groups and instigate intergroup contests in
which males disproportionately bear the costs of fighting [96]. The decoupling of leaders from the costs they incite may
be one of the evolutionary causes of extreme intergroup aggression.
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that, during contests with dominants, they avoid low-cost visual signaling and escalate directly to
high-cost antler clashes. In other words, there is evidence of a 'desperado effect' [1].
Territory may be the most common resource over which groups fight, and may therefore be the
most common resource assessed during intergroup contests (e.g., [27,39,40]). Territory owner-
ship and value effects may vary with where on the territory the contest occurs, for example, at the
territory center versus its boundary [40,41]. However, as observed by Parker [18], territory per se
is not always what competitors fight over; instead, they may fight over the food, mates, or other
resources that the territory holds. As an example, groups might value a small territory with dense
food resources or ample shelter more than they do a large territory with sparse food and shelter.
Therefore, future research into resource effects in intergroup contests should consider both ter-
ritory as well as the resources contained therein (e.g., [42]). For example, banded mongoose
(Mungos mungo) intergroup contests occur at territory boundaries [43], and contests are more
frequent when females are in estrus [44]. Behavioral observations have shown that estrus females
seek out males from neighboring groups, resulting in intergroup contests during which females
oftenmate withmales from the neighboring group [43,45]. The contested resource is thus not ter-
ritory alone, but instead amix of territory, females, and extra-groupmating opportunities. Among-
individual heterogeneity in resource assessment is likely to be important: in banded mongooses,
older males mate-guard estrus females more often than younger males [46]. Compared with
younger males, these older males may bemore motivated to fight off rival males from neighboring
groups to protect their investment in gaining paternity; they may therefore fight harder. Following
from this, the relative proportion of young to old males in a group may influence resource value
and contest success.
Because losing groups lose both territory and the resources it contains, there may be an inter-
action between loser effects and resource value in intergroup contests. If losing groups lose144 Trends in Ecology & Evolution, February 2021, Vol. 36, No. 2
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territory, reaching a threshold at which the group must disband. This effect might be exacerbated
if the same winning group repeatedly encounters the same losing group. The impact of loser
effects on resource loss could lead to selection on groups to avoid losing, for example, by height-
ening resource value, avoiding contests with much stronger neighbors, or by increasing breeding
effort to increase group size (if group size is an RHP proxy), among other possibilities.
How Is Assessment Manifested?
Contest Costs
How competitors assess RHP and resources can be revealed in the types and amounts of costs
losers are willing to incur before they give up the fight (Figure 1). Indeed, one way by which dyadic
assessment strategies are parsed apart is through correlating cost accrual with RHP (Box 1).
In the same way as for RHP, contest costs have been measured by many proxies, including
the energy required to produce behaviors (reviewed in [47]), damage from opponent behaviors
[48] or one’s own behaviors [49], or simply the time allocated to the contest before a loser
gives up that cannot be spent on other tasks [50] (Table 1). Most empirical studies use contest
duration as a cost proxy, assuming that longer fights are costlier (e.g., in terms of energy) than
shorter ones [51]. Some studies have found that what we might assume are costly contest
behaviors may not have high energetic [21,52] or damage [53] costs. In these scenarios, another
useful cost metric might be risk of predation [54].
Intergroup contest costs can come at the level of the individual and the group. Individuals may
suffer time, physiological, or damage (including death) costs. Group costs might simply be the
sum of these individual costs. Alternatively, costs may accrue in a nonlinear fashion, a factor
only recently considered in dyadic contest theory [49,55]. Nonlinear cost relationships might be
found if, for instance, costs to particular group members (e.g., dominant males or reproductive
castes) have a disproportionate impact on group competitive ability. McAuliffe and colleagues
[56] detail examples of human small-scale society warfare in which 'key individuals' participate
more in conflicts and have a greater risk of being killed. Costs to these individuals may have a
stronger effect on group success than costs to other group members. Other individuals may
decide not to pay costs by not engaging in the contest in the first place. These collective action
problems are one feature that is commonly considered in models and empirical studies of
intergroup contests, especially in humans and non-human primates [16,57,58] (Box 2). Finally,
for a given individual, the fitness costs of injury to or death of another group member might be
influenced by their relatedness to that member.
Extreme costs of competition, including death, appear to be more common in intergroup than
dyadic contests. Intergroup contests can regularly result in the death of adults and young in
taxa as diverse as bacteria (multiple species) [8], ants (e.g., fire ants Solenopsis invicta) [59],
termites (e.g., Zootermopsis nevadensis) [60], banded mongooses [44], grey wolves [61], and
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) [62]. Indeed, variation in the rates of group member death is a
key feature used to discriminate between different Lanchester’s law models of intergroup
conflict (Box 1). In dyadic contests, by comparison, lethal fighting is only predicted when the
value of the contested resource is so high as to make the value of any future without the resource
essentially zero [63]. This occurs, for example, when mating opportunities are so rare that it is
worth fighting to the death over access to an unmated female [64]. The reasonswhy lethal fighting
may be more common in intergroup than dyadic contests are underexplored. One explanation
might be that although each individual may use sublethal fighting tactics during intergroup con-
tests, multiple individuals using these tactics on a single opponent (i.e., 'ganging up' on a single
opponent) could result in lethal costs. Another reason might be that individuals that lead orTrends in Ecology & Evolution, February 2021, Vol. 36, No. 2 145
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send troops to war from the safety of a military base (Box 2). Finally, this trend could be an artifact
of the current set of organisms in which intergroup conflict has been studied – given more work in
this area the prevalence of extreme costs may be found to decline.
Aggressive Behaviors
How competitors alter behaviors during a contest can help to reveal assessment strategies and
the costs that competitors are willing to incur (Table 1 and Figure 1). Importantly, behaviors are
not costs in and of themselves; instead, particular behaviors might incur higher costs than others.
For example, competing mantis shrimp (Neogonodactylus bredini) dyads escalate from visual
signaling to the ritualized exchange of high-force strikes, rarely returning to the behaviors they
used before. These behavioral patterns match the predictions of the sequential assessment
model [65,66] in which competitors use ever-costlier behaviors to assess relative ability more
accurately. Different behavioral patterns are predicted by other models of dyadic assessment
(Box 1).
Assessment strategies during intergroup contests can similarly be shown by group and individual
competitive behaviors. For example, during contests with heterospecific competitors, larger
groups of the stingless bee Trigona spinipes more often direct aggression toward vital areas on
their opponent’s bodies (e.g., the head instead of the appendages), suggesting that groups
assess an RHP advantage and attempt to maximize the costs they inflict to their weaker oppo-
nents [67]. Variation in signaling behaviors can also indicate an assessment strategy. Green
woodhoopoe groups compete using vocal rallying, iteratively matching the intensity of each
other’s collective calls. Although short contests were won by territory residents (showing a
resource ownership effect), contests lasting longer than 15 minutes were won by groups with
more members [26]. In long contests, smaller groups might lose not by assessing relative RHP
and deciding to give up, but instead because they reach a physiological limit beyond which
they cannot continue to match the vocal rallies of their larger opponents [26], a strategy matching
self-assessment models (Box 1).
Contest behaviors may vary within a group if members differ in the costs of competition. During
intergroup contests in vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus aethiops pygerythrus), for example, there
is a conflict of interest between the sexes: females with infants benefit from the resources gained
by winning a contest, whereas male sires must avoid the costs of competitive injuries so they can
continue to protect their young [68]. This conflict of interest results in reciprocal punishment:
females use within-group aggression to induce male group-mates to fight [69], whereas males
use within-group aggression to coerce females to avoid future fights [68]. Incentives, not only
punishment, are important: females reward fighting males with affiliative behavior [69]. Overall, in-
dividual variation in intergroup contest behaviors is poorly understood in both theory and practice.
For example, Lanchester’s law models assume that all group members use the same tactics
throughout the contest ([70]; examples of intergroup contest models that incorporate within-
group heterogeneity are given in [13]). Recent developments in individual tracking software
(e.g., [71]) can help experimentalists to quantify individual-level variation in behavior during inter-
group contests, and this might feed back to influence theory.
Biases in the Study of Assessment Strategies
Whether studying behaviors or costs, researchers should avoid biases in what we think animals
can assess during contests. For instance, it seems obviously advantageous to gather information
on relative ability (mutual assessment, Box 1) than to not integrate information about opponent
ability (self-assessment, Box 1). This might lead researchers to think that animals should, and146 Trends in Ecology & Evolution, February 2021, Vol. 36, No. 2
Outstanding Questions
To what extent do self- and mutual
assessment models, and models of
human military and economic conflict,
apply to intergroup contests in other
social organisms?
At what level is intergroup contest
assessment carried out? Do group
members assess themselves and/or
opposing members independently,
or does the whole group unite in
coordinated assessment?
How diverse are intergroup contest
assessment strategies, and what are
the correlates of this diversity? Most
research to date has focused on non-
human primates; studying a wider
array of social-living organisms will
reveal shared principles as well as
differences. For example, social orga-
nization across taxa may co-vary with
assessment strategy.
What is the relative importance of
group- versus individual-level traits in
determining group RHP?
What levels of contest-relevant hetero-
geneity exist within groups, and how
does heterogeneity affect group-level
competitive behaviors and outcomes?
How, and how efficiently, is information
on ability and resources communicated
among group members? Models
of information flow combined with
individual tracking techniques can
help to test this question.
How does selection in the context
of intergroup contests act on the
evolution of social traits? Tests at
both macroevolutionary and population
levels (e.g., via population genetics) will
be useful.
What is the interplay between intergroup
contests and social evolution theory?
How do concepts such as kinship,
reproductive skew, and dominance
inheritance within groups factor into
assessment strategies used during
intergroup contests?
What are the causal links between
intergroup contests and resource
ecology? For example, how are
patterns of resource distribution
affected by variation in the RHP of
competing groups?
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ecological constraints may limit assessment. In these cases, self-assessment or mixed assess-
ment strategies may be more likely [72–74]. Furthermore, assessment strategies might fall
somewhere along a continuum of self to opponent assessment, instead of into the simpler
boxes established by theoretical models [72].
Perceptionmay place another constraint on assessment strategies. One example is Weber’s law,
which suggests that animal sensory systems process information proportionally, not absolutely
[75]. A resulting prediction is that competing groups should more accurately assess group size
differences when groups are small than when they are large. For example, it is easier for a
group of four to assess that they are larger than a group of three than it is a group of 40 to assess
that they are larger than a group of 39, even though the absolute magnitude of the group size
difference (one) is the same. This prediction found support in a test of intergroup contests in
free-ranging dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) [76].
Contest Outcomes
Although the impact of RHP and resources on costs and behaviors is the most common way of
understanding contest assessment, variation in outcomes is also a powerful tool for knowing
what is assessed. This is not only because the ultimate endpoint of assessment is that it deter-
mines which individual or group leaves the contested area and which remains. Outcomes are
also important for establishing RHP proxies [19], and because differentiating among assessment
strategies often involves testing cost–RHP correlations separately for contest winners and losers
[77,78] (Box 1). One example comes from a recent study in meerkats (Suricata suricatta).
Although group size is the best predictor of contest success among meerkat groups, groups
with pups can overcome a group size disadvantage to win the contest [33]. Groups with pups
might have a motivational advantage related to resource value: winning new territory can result
in more food for developing young [33].
A fascinating area for future research is how aggressive tactics (e.g., behaviors) themselves
might determine contest outcomes. Briffa and Lane [79] describe, for dyadic contests, how
choosing the most appropriate behavior not only reveals assessment strategies but might
also influence contest success. For example, a hermit crab (Pagurus bernhardus) can choose
to rap its shell against a competitor or to rock the competitor’s shell back and forth. When
rapping becomes ineffective, hermit crabs that switch to rocking not only show evidence of
mutual assessment but may also increase their likelihood of winning [80]. One example of
tactics in intergroup contests might be in the timing of recruitment. Recruiting group mates
to join the fight too early might increase the likelihood that these individuals are unnecessarily
injured, or might create too large of a group size advantage, resulting in a collective action prob-
lem. On the other hand, waiting too long to recruit could result in losing the contest before re-
inforcements arrive. Results from turtle ants (Cephalotes rohweri) suggest that this species
recruits soldiers according to the defensibility of nests. Turtle ant colonies defend multiple
nests, and nests with large entrances are harder to defend from intruders, irrespective of the
number of soldiers recruited to the entrance [81]. As might be expected, focal groups under
high threat of an intergroup contest decrease soldier recruitment to large-entrance nests;
this might allow the colony to compete over more easily defendable nests while sacrificing
less-defensible nests [81].
Concluding Remarks and Future Perspectives
Intergroup contests are widespread and likely play a key role in both the evolution of social living
and the distributions of groups and the resources they use. In the same way as for dyadicTrends in Ecology & Evolution, February 2021, Vol. 36, No. 2 147
What role do intergroup contests play
in regulating animal populations? Can
studies of intergroup contests inform
conservation research?
Box 3. Models from Economics and Interstate Warfare
Several contest models have been developed in the human economics and interstate warfare literature. Although these
models illuminate the dynamics of intergroup contests, they usually model contests between dyads, for example, between
individual competitors in an economic game or leaders of nations.
Economic 'dynamic contest' models use game theory to ask how behaviors change according to the efforts expended in a
contest and the (expected) payoffs of winning or losing [97]. These models do not explicitly incorporate assessment – that is,
the contest is not modeled as an information-gathering process – but assessment is implied because effort levels change
based on costs and payoffs. An outcome of dynamic contest models relevant to assessment is the 'discouragement effect'
[98]: if the effort required to win a contest exceeds the payoff of success, competitors should stop competing. This is broadly
similar to a 'giving-up decision' in dyadic assessment models, in which a competitor gathers enough information on (their
own and/or opponent) resource holding potential (RHP) to decide to give up the fight. In dynamic contest models, both
parties can experience a discouragement effect, leading to a two-sided peace [98] similar to 'dear enemy' effects in territorial
groups [99]. Dynamic contest models appreciate a variety of contest forms, including tug-of-war contests, races, tourna-
ments, and repeated incumbency contests [97].
Models of interstate warfare have explicitly considered the assessment of ability. Fearon [100] argued that, if the leaders of
nations had perfect information on relative strength, they should resolve conflicts without war. Only with imperfect informa-
tion on ability, or if nations are incentivized to conceal information on ability, should warfare result as a means gathering this
information. This insight led to 'costly process' models of warfare in which (i) the conflict itself facilitates assessment of
relative ability, (ii) nations can return to the bargaining table, and (iii) warfare ceases when the opponent’s ability to continue
competing, or to inflict costs, is accurately assessed ([101–103], reviewed in [104]). Costly process models have been
related to dyadic assessment models [105].
Rusch and Gavrilets [13] review intergroup conflict models (some based on the economics literature) with more than two
players. These models ask how the frequency of, and individual and group-level efforts during, intergroup contests are
affected by within-group heterogeneity in payoffs and costs. However, as Rusch and Gavrilets [13] note, n-player models
that explicitly consider assessment (e.g., of relative RHP) during intergroup contests are rare.
Trends in Ecology & Evolution
OPEN ACCESScontests, research into assessment during intergroup contests can link RHP, the ownership and
value of resources, and experience with the decisions groups make during contests.
Future work on intergroup contests will benefit from connections between theory and experiment
similar to those that are fundamental to the dyadic contest assessment framework (see
Outstanding Questions). For example, game-theoretical models of assessment strategies during
intergroup contests, as well as adaptations of human warfare and economic models (Box 3), can
be validated and expanded upon by experimental tests and field-based observations. There is
also exciting scope for testing how the unique challenges of group living (e.g., heterogeneity
and social cohesion, Box 2) affect assessment strategies. Studies of intergroup conflict may
also inform ecology and conservation; for example, if intergroup conflict acts to limit population
densities (e.g., [61]). Combined with our strong knowledge from dyadic contests, a focus on
intergroup contest assessment can lead to a united understanding of how animals gather and
use information during contests.Acknowledgments
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